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INTRODUCTION
“Simplicity . . . is taken to be a great American virtue.”1
James Baldwin.
Simplification of the legal system has attracted attention as a means
of improving access to justice. A major motivation driving reform is
the perception that pro se litigants have flooded the courts and begun
clogging up the wheels of justice.2 Ordinary people do not know rules
of procedure, evidence, or substantive law; do not handle their cases
effectively or efficiently; and have, the argument goes, generated a
“pro se crisis.”3 A number of states and localities have responded by
increasing the availability of legal services, funding programs that offer
solutions ranging from limited assistance to full representation, and a
few legislatures have even established a statutory right to counsel for
particular categories of cases.4 Given the expense of advocates’ labor,
however, most jurisdictions have sought instead to improve litigants’
* Associate Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill. Many thanks to Tonya Brito, Brooke Coleman, Scott Cummings, Russell Engler,
Rebecca Kunkel, and Lauren Sudeall Lucas for ideas and to Candace Elizabeth Speller
and Tyler Walters for research assistance.
1.
James Baldwin, Address to the National Press Club Weekly Luncheon: The
World I Never Made (Dec. 10, 1986), https://www.c-span.org/video/?150875-1/worldmade (last visited, Mar. 23, 2018).
2.
See, e.g., Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil Gideon (and for Pro Se
Court Reform), 62 FLA. L. REV. 1227, 1274 (2010) (arguing that pro se court reform
“would alleviate the pro se crisis, make better use of precious judicial resources, save
money and (as a bonus) produce better, fairer outcomes”) (emphasis added); Richard
Zorza, Some First Thoughts on Court Simplification, The Key to Civil Access and
Justice Transformation, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 845, 857–63 (2013) (listing goals of
simplification).
3.
See, e.g., Barton supra note 2, at 1270–72.
4.
Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court, 47
CONN. L. REV. 741, 760–61 (2015).
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ability to handle their legal matters on their own.5 As an alternative to
providing litigants with representatives who could help them navigate
the courts, a growing number of commentators propose simplifying
proceedings to obviate the need for such representation.6 Methods of
simplification include creating form pleadings, introducing technology,
and relaxing formal rules that could confuse lay litigants.7 Proponents
of simplification claim that it will decrease the time and cost of
proceedings,8 help litigants meet the technical requirements of the fora
in which they appear,9 and increase litigants’ satisfaction with the
process.10
This essay argues that the objectives of the simplification project
are incomplete and carry potential downsides. It does not take the
position that such efforts should be abandoned but recommends that
their limits and unintended consequences receive careful scrutiny. Prior
commentary has highlighted challenges of simplification from an
individual litigant’s standpoint, such as the risk of substandard services
and the reality that one-size-fits-all will not fit everyone.11 This essay
turns instead to the efficiency goals themselves and how they affect the
administration of justice broadly defined.12 Part I critiques the goal of
5.
See Barton, supra note 2, at 1269–71. Cf. Richard Abel, State, Market,
Philanthropy, and Self-Help as Legal Services Delivery Mechanisms, in PRIVATE
LAWYERS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE EVOLVING ROLE OF PRO BONO IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 295, 298 (Robert Granfield & Lynn Mather eds., 2009) (delineating four
models for the delivery of services: (1) state; (2) philanthropy; (3) market; and (4) selfhelp).
6.
See Barton, supra note 2, at 1234 (“[B]etter pro se courts would expose
how unnecessary lawyers are in many cases.”); Zorza, supra note 2, at 860–61 (“A
major component of cost reduction comes from reducing the need for full advocacy
services.”). Some commentators also favor simplification of substantive law. Id. at 878;
BEN BARTON & STEPHANOS BIBAS, ROBOOTING JUSTICE 201–04 (2017). Thoughtful
scholars and policymakers have also recommended combined approaches that include
appointment of counsel and elements of simplification. See, e.g., Russell Engler,
Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal About
When Counsel is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 38–39 (2010).
7.
See Martha Minow, Foreword to BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL
JUSTICE IN AMERICA xv, xvii (Samuel Estriecher & Joy Radice eds., 2016) [hereinafter
BEYOND ELITE LAW].
8.
See, e.g., Zorza supra note 2, at 856 (system faces “no real pressure for
simplification, other than occasional, if intensifying, budget crises”).
9.
See, e.g., Steinberg, supra, note 4, at 788.
10.
Zorza, supra note 2, at 858.
11.
See, e.g., Raymond H. Brescia, What We Know and Need to Know About
Disruptive Innovation, 67 S.C. L. REV. 203, 215–16 (2016).
12.
See also Brooke D. Coleman, The Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1777
(2015) (arguing against civil procedure reform in the name of “efficiency” that cuts
pecuniary costs while neglecting other categories of costs and benefits); Zachary
Liscow, Is Efficiency Biased?, at 3 (Aug. 14, 2017) (unpublished manuscript)
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cutting costs. Part II critiques the goal of increasing speed. Part III
urges that public interest law values figure more prominently in access
to justice reform.
I.

JUSTICE FOR LESS

Proponents of simplification argue that the access to justice crisis
makes a complex court system too expensive to administer fairly.13 It is
simply unrealistic to expect lawyers to be available to represent all
litigants who need counsel, so we should instead devise solutions less
expensive than representation.14 If there is a cheaper alternative that
offers the same substantive outcomes at a fraction of the price, no one
could object. Indeed, Professor Ben Barton claims that if we develop a
low-cost alternative that allows people to represent themselves, poor
litigants could become the envy of the rich; only lawyers and their selfinterest stand in the way of such a future.15
Yet the push to make the legal process cheaper rests on two flawed
assumptions: (1) providing services at lower cost is (necessarily)
socially useful; and (2) decreasing the cost of services increases the
availability of services (and is the only or best way to expand
availability to reach people with limited financial resources).
First, making justice cheaper is a socially positive result only if
there is a net positive in social benefits. As Brooke Coleman has
observed in the federal context, commentators considering reforms of
the civil justice system often collapse the categorical assessments of
“cheap” and “efficient.”16 They determine that money-saving reforms
are efficient without accounting for the full range of benefits and losses
that result.17 The same mistake appears in analyses of poor people’s
courts. Many efficiency assessments neglect substantive case outcomes.

(explaining that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, measured by willingness to pay, benefits the
rich over the poor), [https://perma.cc/A73G-2H84].
13.
BARTON & BIBAS, supra note 6, at 203 (“Complexity is thus at odds with
equal justice under law.”); Steinberg, supra note 4, at 806–07.
14.
But see RICHARD L. ABEL, Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL
JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 1, 7 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982) [hereinafter
INFORMAL JUSTICE] (“Political choice is portrayed as blind necessity............. Informal
institutions are said to be a necessary response to inexorable economic forces. The
courts are ‘overcrowded,’ there is ‘too much’ litigation.............. Yet even if this were
conceded . . . it would not dictate a response. The courts could be relieved of their
congestion instantaneously if they expelled all corporate plaintiffs or prohibited the
government from litigating.”).
15.
Barton, supra note 2, at 1273.
16.
Coleman, supra note 12, at 1777.
17.
Id. at 1777–78.
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Substantive case outcomes must receive consideration. To the
extent that simplicity helps litigants manage technical requirements,
simplification might provide the appearance of improved court access.
For example, if a court simplifies the process for filing responsive
pleadings, it might decrease the number of default judgments. Yet
keeping a pro se defendant’s case alive means little if the substantive
outcome is unaffected because she does not know how to prove the
defenses contained in her form answer.18
Many studies tout pro se court reforms as successful because of
litigant satisfaction but, even assuming litigant surveys are accurate,19
subjective indicators should not be the primary measure of success.
Subjective assessments of court functioning reflect expectations as
much as results and should not be given undue weight.20 Litigant
satisfaction does matter from a democratic perspective and one of
human decency, but ultimately courts make decisions that allocate
resources and responsibilities. How people feel about the process is
only part of the story. Legitimacy is a necessary ingredient for a
healthy legal system but not sufficient.
Without substantive justice, acceptance of the legal system might
be more damaging than helpful.21 It remains unclear that pro se court
reform yields substantive outcomes comparable to those produced by
legal representation.22 On an individual level, unless accuracy of
outcomes is protected, the promise of efficiency fails.23
Even if individual case outcomes were the same, social outcomes
beyond individual cases must also be considered. Public adjudication

18.
See Steinberg, supra note 4, at 784–85.
19.
See ABEL, supra note 14, at 8 (“[A]although applicants certainly want
cheap, speedy justice, justice may be more important than speed—and they may be
willing to pay for it. Finally, there is considerable evidence that people want authority
rather than informality. They want the leverage of state power to obtain the redress they
believe is theirs by right, not a compromise that purports to restore a social peace that
never existed.”).
20.
Gary Blasi, How Much Access? How Much Justice?, 73 FORDHAM L.
REV. 865, 870 (2005).
21.
See Engler, supra note 6, at 87–88 (“If tenants expect to lose in housing
court, and landlords expect to win, advice to the tenant that explains the process but
fails to affect the outcome might lead to satisfied landlords and tenants.”).
22.
See, e.g., Engler, supra note 6, at 90.
23.
Even for individuals, adjudication produces much more than case
outcomes. It can create collateral consequences for parties’ physical, emotion, and
financial health. See Catherine R. Albiston & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Expanding the
Empirical Study of Access to Justice, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 101, 111–12; Kathryn A.
Sabbeth, The Prioritization of Criminal Over Civil Counsel and the Discounted Danger
of Private Power, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 889, 910–15 (2015).

2018:287

Simplicity as Justice

291

serves multiple democratic purposes: development of law,24
participatory deliberation, public education, deterrence,25 and,
occasionally, social change.26 The administration of justice is different
from a commodity or service to be delivered to market as smoothly as
possible at a cost as close as possible to zero. Reforms of the courts
concern the design of a justice system, and reducing the costs of the
system’s administration could result in unintended consequences.
The imposition of costs can actually produce positive social
outcomes. To the extent that costs are borne by wrongdoers, costs can
deter misconduct. This is a basic principle of tort law.27 Social science
research demonstrates that the possibility of incurring costs serves the
goal of deterrence. In particular, defendants report that the threat of
being saddled with victims’ attorneys’ fees makes a difference in their
calculus about their activity.28 Notably, in this context, where the
attorney fees result in a deterrent effect, the cost of public interest
lawyers is not a necessary evil but a socially useful feature of the
current system’s design. Were the cost of advocates’ labor reduced,
certain categories of misconduct might increase.
Second, another benefit of retaining the costs of the legal system
might be that the imposition of costs draws attention to otherwise
neglected social problems. The alleged crisis of pro se litigants
overwhelming the courts reflects a social reality: in many of these
cases, people too poor to hire lawyers are getting dragged into court for
failure to comply with property law.29 Those failures to comply with
property law, such as to pay rent due, reflect a broader set of political
and economic circumstances, including the growing gap between wages
and housing expenses. The attention attracted by costs of the legal
24.
See Colleen Shanahan, Anna Carpenter & Alyx Mark, Can a Little
Representation Be a Dangerous Thing?, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1367 (2017) (describing law
reform activities that may atrophy in the absence of representation).
25.
See Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, Funding the Cause:
How Public Interest Law Organizations Fund Their Activities and Why It Matters for
Social Change, 39 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 62, 86 (2014).
26.
See Kathryn A. Sabbeth & David C. Vladeck, Contracting (Out) Rights,
36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 830–31 (2009) (highlighting benefits of public adjudication
to be considered when evaluating private dispute resolution mechanisms).
27.
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner & William M. Landes, An Economic Theory
of Intentional Torts, 1 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 127 (1981).
28.
See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 25, at 86 (quoting plaintiffs’ lawyers
explaining that attorneys’ fees are the “number one . . . deterrent to companies”)
(citations omitted).
29.
David J. Luban, Self-Representation, Access to Justice, and the Quality of
Counsel: A Comment on Rabeea Assy’s Injustice in Person: The Right of SelfRepresentation,
JERUSALEM REV.
LEGAL STUD.,
*17–19
(forthcoming),
[https://perma.cc/X3TR-VPQK] (describing other examples of broader changes that
cause apparent growth in pro se population).
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system could potentially get directed toward developing solutions to the
underlying social problems.
Although this normatively positive impact of costs has not
previously been studied, examples of it have emerged in criminal law.
In the criminal context, the costs of the justice system have successfully
resulted in the decriminalization of conduct.30 Decriminalization has
included removing categories of conduct from criminal law statutes;
decreasing penalties for criminal acts still on the books; declining to
enforce criminal laws as a matter of discretion; and replacing
punishments, like incarceration, with attempts to address underlying
causes of the criminal conduct, such as through drug treatment.31 For
those troubled by mass incarceration and its collateral consequences,
these efforts might provide a step in the right direction. Regardless of
the merits of these particular solutions, they suggest that the pressures
imposed by systemic costs could inspire consideration of policies that
would otherwise never be attempted.
In the housing context, if a perception develops that there are too
many eviction cases and eviction defense is expensive, this might put
pressure on governments to improve substantive housing laws to
promote affordable housing. In this sense, the causal arrow could go
both ways: the rise in homelessness in gentrifying cities has created
pressure to appoint housing defense lawyers;32 the work of housing
lawyers and the expense of supplying them could also draw attention
back to the social phenomena that make housing difficult to maintain.
Subsidies for civil counsel were never intended to solve a problem
of legal services’ unaffordability. Rather, they comprised one part of a
programmatic effort to address broader inequalities. Ideally, providing
lawyers to the poor was hoped to be a temporary solution, necessary
only until the underlying inequalities were alleviated. As a historical
matter, this was the purpose of the Legal Services Corporation: to aid
the War on Poverty.33 In the current era, the cost of lawyers could
potentially create incentives for adoption of more fundamental solutions
to the underlying social problems.
An obvious counterargument is that our current legal system is far
from that ideal, and right now the costs of retaining counsel and
30.
See Mary Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Justice: The Future of Penal Law, 90
N.C. L. REV. 581, 634–37 (2012); Jordan Blair Woods, Decriminalization, Police
Authority, and Routine Traffic Stops, 62 UCLA L. REV. 672, 701–02 (2015).
31.
Woods, supra note 30, at 683–84, 686, 689, 693.
32.
Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Housing Defense as the New Gideon, 41 HARV. J.L.
& GENDER, at 30–35 (forthcoming 2018), [https://perma.cc/7XYV-77T5].
33.
William P. Quigley, The Demise of Law Reform and the Triumph of Legal
Aid: Congress and the Legal Services Corporation from the 1960’s to the 1990’s, 17
ST. LOUIS U. L. REV. 241, 244–45 (1998).
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participating in litigation deter people from enforcing their rights. As an
obstacle to access, costs thwart the rule of law and the capacity of the
legal system to protect vulnerable members of society. For example, a
tenant without the resources to retain counsel might give up her home
when her landlord threatens eviction even if the case would be nonmeritorious and a housing defense lawyer could have filed a successful
motion to dismiss. Even parties able to retain counsel may be stymied
as the costs of litigation mount. Wealthy parties regularly use discovery
devices and motion practice to make it impossible for less powerful
actors to pursue meritorious claims to conclusion. If proceedings were
simplified and less expensive, access would not be reserved for the
rich.
Yet the relationship between financial resources and the ability to
pursue or defend against litigation stems from the rule that all parties,
regardless of means, absorb their own litigation costs. Imagine if costs
could be separated from particular private parties and instead were
absorbed by another source, another private party, or the state. To
suggest that decreasing the cost of services increases their availability
assumes that availability requires the ability to pay. This relies on
market logic—services will be distributed based on who can pay and
how much. Yet market logic is not the only way to conceive of the
distribution of legal (or other goods) and services.34
For example, fee-shifting statutes support the distribution of legal
services using a different approach. They deliver services to a defined
category of victims and assign the costs to the wrongdoers.
Specifically, they require defendants to cover prevailing plaintiffs’
attorney fees in areas of litigation recognized by Congress as in the
public interest.35 Under fee-shifting provisions, rather than the means of
the parties, what matters is the subject matter of the litigation and
whether the plaintiff substantially prevailed. Although fee-shifting
statutes as a solution to access to justice have their own limitations,36

34.
See Rebecca Roiphe, The Decline of Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 649, 650–53 (2016).
35.
See Kathryn A. Sabbeth, What’s Money Got to Do with It? Public Interest
Lawyering and Profit, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 441, 465–68 (2014).
36.
For a discussion of how fee-shifting schemes have faltered under attacks
from the Supreme Court, see Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of
Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 600 (2001) (ruling that serving as a catalyst for
change in a defendant’s behavior is not sufficient to obtain payment for lawyers); Evans
v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 728–30 (1986) (ruling that defendants may condition a
settlement for full injunctive relief on waiver of all fees for plaintiffs’ counsel); Marek
v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1, 10 (1985) (holding that a Rule 68 offer of judgment could cut
off entitlement to fees), and even when they function, they reward only particular
subsets of cases. See ALAN K. CHEN & SCOTT L. CUMMINGS, PUBLIC INTEREST
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the point is this: the expense of legal representation does not have to be
borne by the parties to whom our current system assigns it. Costs can
be separated from the litigants for whom they are expended. If costs
can be separated from the litigants, making the process cheaper is not
necessarily relevant to poor litigants’ access to courts.
II.

SWIFT JUSTICE

Proponents of simplification argue that it will allow cases to move
more quickly.37 This will not only make judges’ jobs easier but also will
improve the experience of litigants. The sluggishness of court processes
can be particularly burdensome for unrepresented parties. Unlike those
with counsel to appear on their behalf, pro se parties must attend all
court dates and wait for their cases to be called.
Yet we ought not to embrace speed to the point of unraveling
rights. Russell Engler makes this point well:
Eviction cases would be greatly simplified if the landlord did
not have to prove his prima facie case, or tenants were not
allowed to raise defenses. . . . The question remains as to
whether speed is a good or bad thing. Where unrepresented
litigants are steamrolled in housing court, slowing down the
system is an important goal.38
To the extent that the assertion of rights requires time (or money)
and the denial of that opportunity saves resources, there remains a
question as to whether the savings are worth it. The Supreme Court
indicated with its Mathews v. Eldridge39 due process test that cutting
such corners is sometimes a constitutionally acceptable choice.40 Yet
even if constitutionally permissible, such choices may not be good
policy. Where do we draw the line? As a society, we recognize that
efficiency goals should sometimes give way to higher ones. To the
extent that speed is pursued at the expense of compromising rights,
caution is required.
One of the best arguments in favor of simplification is that
complexity allows technicalities to thwart the rule of law and trip up

LAWYERING: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 188–89 (2013); Albiston & Sandefur,
supra note 23, at 114.
37.
See, e.g., Zorza supra note 2, at 854–55.
38.
Engler, supra note 6, at 76, 87.
39.
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
40.
Id. at 348.
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disadvantaged parties who might otherwise prevail.41 To be sure, this
does occur with some regularity. Yet “technicalities” that thwart the
application of law can cut both ways.42
Slower processes can offer benefits to otherwise disadvantaged
parties. For a poor tenant facing eviction by a landlord, slowing down
the process has particular value. It can provide time to scrape together
money to pay the rent, to accumulate evidence in her defense, or to
locate alternate housing if ultimately she is forced out of her home. The
possibility of delay can also convince a landlord to settle on terms that
account for tenants’ rights and interests.43
Some of the complexities of housing law were inserted by
legislatures to protect tenants. It is useful to consider whether
simplification of housing court processes could potentially cause some
of these tenant protections to be lost. For example, landlords are
generally required to serve a notice of termination within a particular
window of time prior to terminating a tenancy. Without adequate prior
notice, the tenancy has not been terminated, and an eviction action
cannot be pursued (unless and until the tenancy is terminated properly).
If a landlord files an action without proper notice and termination, a
tenant can file a motion to dismiss, and the action must be dismissed.
That dismissal would generally be granted without prejudice so the
landlord could file a new action after proper notice and termination.
Were the court process streamlined in the interest of speed, this kind of
“inefficiency” could potentially go by the wayside.
For poor defendants in civil and criminal proceedings, requiring
the opposing party to complete a series of steps before a judgment in its
favor can be enormously beneficial, and often this is the only hope they
have. Such procedural steps can trip up the plaintiff or prosecutor (as in
a landlord’s failure to provide notice, resulting in dismissal of an
action), or offer the defendant a second chance (as in the tenant’s
opportunity to create a record of good behavior after an initial incident
of alleged nuisance), with either resulting in an improved outcome for
the defendant. Even when the outcome remains unchanged, procedural
hoops can at least hold that final judgment at bay.
Whether it is by allowing a different substantive result to come
about or just delaying the inevitable, the process checks the application
of the plaintiff’s or prosecutor’s otherwise unbridled power. It might be
41.
See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculation on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 124 (1974) (arguing that complexity
favors the party with more resources, because they can better manipulate the many
rules).
42.
See ABEL, supra note 14, at 10–11.
43.
Mark H. Lazerson, In the Halls of Justice, the Only Justice is in the
Halls, in INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 119, 131.
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said that for parties disadvantaged by the surrounding economic system
and the underlying substantive law,44 procedural protections are the
most that the disadvantaged can expect from the system.
It is for this reason that historically the critique of lawyers as
clogging up the courts with overly clever use of technicalities has been
lodged to undercut public interest lawyering. In the 1980s, federal
legislators argued that capital defense attorneys were manipulating
processes rather than promoting fair trials, and then imposed massive
funding cuts to capital defender offices.45 Just this past year, Attorney
General Jeff Sessions used similar rhetoric in an attempt to undermine
lawyers for immigrants, arguing, “[S]mart attorneys have exploited
loopholes in the law.”46 Yet for capital defendants and immigrants
facing removal, it is essential that proper procedures be followed before
extraordinarily harsh consequences are visited upon them.
This is true not only as a matter of fairness to the individual
defendants but also in the interest of restraining excesses of power. The
function of due process may be understood as erecting obstacles
between the individual and the force of the state.47 In the words of
Herbert Packer, “maximal efficiency means maximal tyranny.”48
Monroe Freedman argued that the purpose of the criminal trial is not
44.
Substantive law criminalizes a broad range of behaviors and favors the
rights of those who own property over those who do not. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Poor
People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE. L.J. 2176, 2183 (2013)
(“The criminal law deliberately ignores the social conditions that breed some forms of
law-breaking. Deviations associated with poverty are not usually ‘defenses’ to criminal
liability ”).
45.
See Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Capital Defenders as Outsider Lawyers, 89 CHI.
KENT L. REV. 569, 591 (2014).
46.
Jeff D. Sessions, Attorney Gen., Remarks to the Executive Office for
Immigration Review (Oct. 12, 2017), [https://perma.cc/UG97-WUWN].
47.
DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 62 (1988)
(describing the criminal adversarial process and the lawyer’s role within it as creating
an obstacle course for the State); Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal
Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 13 (1964) (“[T]he Due Process Model looks very much
like an obstacle course. Each of its successive stages is designed to present formidable
impediments to carrying the accused any further along in the process.”).
48
See Packer, supra note 47, at 16. Packer elaborates:
Precisely because of its potency in subjecting the individual to the coercive
power of the state, the criminal process must, on this model, be subjected to
controls and safeguards that prevent it from operating with maximal
efficiency. According to this ideology, maximal efficiency means maximal
tyranny. And, while no one would assert that minimal efficiency means
minimal tyranny, the proponents of the Due Process Model would accept
with considerable equanimity a substantial diminution in the efficiency with
which the criminal process operates in the interest of preventing official
oppression of the individual.
Id.
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(only) to seek truth but to protect individual rights, and that truthseeking functions may be subordinated to those protecting individual
dignity.49 I would argue that this insight extends beyond the
requirements of constitutional jurisprudence and individual rights, as it
reflects a general truth of “political theory and historical experience.”50
There is democratic value in containing potential abuse by powerful
parties.51
Although Freedman focused his writing on criminal defense, the
need for restraints on excessive power exists also in civil contexts.52
Just a quick review of poor people’s courts reveals that the state is the
adversary of the pro se party in a wide variety of civil cases—from
public housing eviction to termination of parental rights—not only in
criminal prosecution.53 Just as zealous legal representation and vigilant
maintenance of the adversary system serve to check state power in
criminal cases, the need for restraint exists in these civil contexts as
well.54
Even when the state is not a party in the technical sense, the state
plays a role. The state creates, maintains, adjudicates, and enforces all
law.55 Ultimately, the state’s force is at play in all adjudication.56 The
state requires the parties to appear or else face the penalty of a default
judgment and execution of that judgment. The state literally enforces
those judgments parties refuse or are unable to satisfy. If a losing party
fails to pay a monetary judgment, a sheriff will forcibly seize her
assets. If a landlord wins an eviction case, an agent of the state will
forcibly remove any tenant who remains in possession of the property.57
The violence of economic force can be as important as violence to the

49.
See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM
2–3 (1975) (suggesting that the purpose of the criminal trial is to protect individual
rights, not to seek truth); id. at 3–4 (describing human dignity as among the “higher
values” to which even truth-seeking may be subordinated). See also Packer, supra note
47, at 17 (describing “guilt-defeating doctrines” of due process model).
50.
See LUBAN, supra note 47, at 60 (“We want to handicap the state in its
power even legitimately to punish us, for we believe as a matter of political theory and
historical experience that if the state is not handicapped or restrained ex ante, our
political and civil liberties are jeopardized.”).
51.
See FREEDMAN, supra note 49, at 2.
52.
See Sabbeth, supra note 23, at 923–24.
53.
Id. at 923.
54.
Id. at 921–23.
55.
Id. at 927 n.261.
56.
Id.
57.
Id.
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physical body,58 and, ultimately, the latter is always available to back
up the former.
Like other state actors, judges, too, abuse their power. This results
not only from implicit and explicit bias related to race, class, and
gender,59 but also to the desire for speed. While some judges have
demonstrated a deep and sincere commitment to improving fairness for
pro se litigants, many others support access to justice measures
primarily because of the time they hope to shave off proceedings. They
express hostility towards poor people who consume too much judicial
attention. For example, judges presiding over criminal cases regularly
express frustration about the time lost to the assertion of rights by poor
people’s lawyers.60 Judges in housing courts have long allowed
landlords to obtain judgments without showing any admissible evidence
and silenced tenants who have attempted to articulate arguments in their
own defense.61 It is difficult for an attorney to push back against such
judicial conduct, but it is all the more challenging for a pro se
layperson. Indeed, one of the major reasons for the establishment of
counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings was the determination that,
even in a seemingly non-adversarial context, poor people are at a
disadvantage.62 While it is possible that an educational program could
be undertaken to change judicial attitudes,63 evidence from the
development of the right to criminal defense counsel indicates that it is
establishment of a clear right to counsel that may be most effective in
changing court culture.64 In the absence of restraints on their power,
58.
See Sarah Buhler, “Don’t Want to Get Exposed”: Law’s Violence and
Access to Justice, 26 J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 68, 74–75 (2017) (summarizing critical
literature on the “violence of social and economic inequality”). See also Sabbeth, supra
note 23, at 910 (discussing definitions of liberty that privilege freedom from
incarceration over other forms).
59.
See Sabbeth, supra note 32 (collecting literature).
60.
See, e.g., Nicole Martorano Van Cleve, Reinterpreting the Zealous
Advocate: Multiple Intermediate Roles of the Criminal Defense Attorney, in LAWYERS IN
PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 293, 299, 309–12 (Leslie C. Levin
& Lynn Mather eds., 2012).
61.
See, e.g., Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and
Subordination of Poor Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533
(1992).
62.
See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
63.
See Rebecca L. Sandefur, Elements of Professional Expertise,
Understanding Relational and Substantive Expertise Through Lawyers’ Impact, 80 AM.
SOC. REV. 909, 910 (2015) (explaining that lawyers’ “presence in a courtroom
encourages the court to follow its own rules”).
64.
See Sara Mayeux, What Gideon Did, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 15, 18–23
(2016) (describing how judges pre-Gideon showed little regard for the right to
appointed counsel, even when mandated by state law, but attitudes shifted after the
decision).
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even well-intended judges might simplify proceedings to the point of
sacrificing litigants’ substantive and procedural rights.65
In addition to the need to spend time to protect litigants’ rights,
investments of time can offer inherent benefits. Like the financial costs
discussed in the previous section, time costs can result in socially
beneficial consequences, such as increased public education and
deterrence. For example, litigation that attracts attention can educate
the public and impact the reputations of alleged bad actors.66 When
more time passes before the parties reach a resolution, potentially more
education and deterrence can result from the litigation process.
Reputational harms—such as to employee morale, customer loyalty,
and investor interest—can translate into financial impact exceeding that
of a monetary judgment.67 Even before or without any monetary
judgment, information unearthed during discovery, along with any
media coverage, can magnify reputational harms. The longer litigation
continues, the more potential there is for reputational damage from
discovery produced and disseminated, and the longer media actors will
continue to remind the public of the underlying misconduct alleged.
While most of the literature on this topic comes from federal litigation,
the logic could potentially apply in other public interest cases,
particularly if poor parties work in concert with organizers who bring
broader attention to the underlying conduct. Delay can increase the
capacity of litigation to educate the public and influence the reputations
of alleged bad actors. Slowness of adjudication is not necessarily a bad
thing.
It must be acknowledged that slowing the machinery of justice is
not only a potential byproduct of respecting poor people’s rights, such
as that of the tenant to raise defenses in Engler’s example, but such
slowing is often an intentional strategy on behalf of the disadvantaged
precisely because it can benefit them. Advocates of a right to counsel in
civil matters tend to assert that counsel will smooth out and speed up
proceedings currently slowed down by pro se litigants’ confusion. Yet
the presence of lawyers can also have the reverse effect; indeed, delay

65.
See Zorza, supra note 2, at 857 (arguing for decreasing requirements for
written opinions articulating bases for judicial decisions); cf. Steinberg, supra note 4, at
787–88 n.256 (advocating for simplification measures but highlighting the need for
limits on judicial discretion).
66.
See Jules Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, 52 UCLA L. REV. 477,
493–509 (2004) (describing history of litigation attracting public attention); Roy
Shapira, Reputation Through Litigation, How the Legal System Shapes Behavior by
Producing Information, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1193, 1200–01 (2016).
67.
See Kishanthi Parella, Reputational Regulation, 67 DUKE
L.J.
(forthcoming 2018), [https://perma.cc/MEE8-5PVM].
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by lawyers is often intentional.68 The ethics of intentional delay are
beyond the scope of this essay, but the point is that speed is not a
neutral or inherently positive value: the meanings assigned to speed and
delay depend on the political, economic, and legal environment.
Whether speed is an unvarnished good depends on the context and goals
of adjudication. Sometimes checks on power require time to administer,
and sometimes delay is itself an important check.
III. PUBLIC INTEREST LAW
Although the drive to simplify poor people’s courts reflects efforts
to make justice attainable for a larger percentage of the population, it
should not go unnoticed that a similar trend has been underway across
U.S. civil and criminal justice systems. In recent decades, a “cost-anddelay narrative” has driven reforms of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, even in the face of contradictory empirical evidence.69 The
populist70 push to simplify courts and make them accessible without the
need for lawyers71 reflects a broader anti-lawyer sentiment and antiregulation trend, which favor privatizing adjudication and eschewing
formal law for informal arrangements.72
The shift from formal law to informal arrangements includes a
dramatic reduction in trials. Increasingly, civil litigation ends in
settlements73 and criminal defendants accept pleas.74 Litigants resolve
their cases through negotiation rather than adjudication.75 Individual
choice of contract, rather than the mandatory application of rules,

68.
See BARTON & BIBAS, supra note 6, at 108.
69.
See Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice
Reform: Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1090 (2012).
70.
See, e.g., Editors’ Preface to BEYOND ELITE LAW, supra note 7, at xi
(arguing that the U.S. legal system “remains, at its core, a system of elite law largely
for the elite” and “system redesign is needed to help people better represent
themselves”).
71.
See, e.g., supra note 6 and accompanying sources.
72.
See, e.g., Judith Resnick, Lawyers’ Ethics Beyond the Vanishing Trial:
Unrepresented Claimants, De Facto Aggregations, Arbitration Mandates,
and
Privatized Processes, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899 (2017).
73.
See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials
and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459,
461–84 (2004); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1073–75
(1984); David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J.
2619 (1995).
74.
See, e.g., Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1089, 1093–94 (2013).
75.
Query how voluntary these arrangements are and what alternatives, if any,
exist.
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governs.76 Both the process and the results remain outside the public
eye.77
Much dispute resolution has migrated out of the courthouse
altogether. In many jurisdictions, mediation is mandatory as a
prerequisite to adjudication. Quotidian activities, such as purchasing a
cell phone or accepting a job at a chain restaurant,78 require giving up
the right to judicial adjudication and replacing it with arbitration. The
replacement fora are favored for reaching results that are not required
or restrained by the parties’ legal relationships. Unlike the rough justice
of law, the argument goes, parties can craft solutions that are tailored to
what they are able and willing to offer. Access to justice has been
marshaled as an argument in favor of alternative dispute resolution. The
“simpler” fora are touted as more easily navigated by ordinary
individuals, including those without counsel.79 I’ve argued elsewhere
that the reality is less encouraging, both for individuals and for society
as a whole.80
Some of the democratic purposes of public courts could appear to
have more relevance for civil rights cases in federal courts than eviction
cases in small claims court. Yet the need for public airing of disputes
may be equally if not more important in poor people’s courts. The
simplification trend in access to justice discussions reveals a growing
chasm between access to justice for poor people and public interest law.
The simplification approach assumes legal services lawyers will not be
doing any public interest law of the law-changing or law-challenging
kind.81
The drive to simplify proceedings and distill them to a one-sizefits-all approach suggests poverty law is static, or at least that it is
incapable of revision on behalf of the less powerful through litigation.
It treats law as a cumbersome tool to be managed. This neglects the
ways creative lawyering can revise case law over time so that the
substance becomes better (or at least less bad) for the poor.
76.
See Resnick, supra note 72, at 1921 (citing her own earlier work); Josh
Bowers, Two Rights to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1133 (2013); Jenny Roberts,
Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650 (2013).
77.
See Resnick, supra note 72, at 1920–21.
78.
See id. at 1926–30 (discussing EEOC v. Waffle House and reprinting
arbitration “contract” at issue in that case).
79.
See Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate
Over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
559, 563 (2001).
80.
Sabbeth & Vladeck, supra note 26.
81.
See Shanahan et al., supra note 24, at 1367 (“From the perspective of
solving the civil access to justice crisis, it seems like a concession to the larger crisis to
give some individuals representation—when they would otherwise have none—yet be
satisfied when this representation excludes them from the evolution of the law.”).
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Simplification, with its de-emphasis on law and reliance on
unrepresented parties to serve themselves, leaves little room for public
interest law as an agent of change.
Some might argue that simplification devices will free up more
time for legal services lawyers to handle public interest law cases, but it
remains unclear how lawyers will find those matters. Who will make
the assessment of complexity and at what stage? To the extent a line
can be drawn between public interest and ordinary matters (which is
questionable),82 that distinction is not always apparent at the outset of
representation. Finding a complicated issue or the potential to influence
precedent can happen along the way; a lawyer conducting an evaluation
might not know what a case involves before finding herself knee-deep
in a knotty problem that at first appeared simple.
Many nooks and crannies of poverty law have not been litigated
precisely because of the underavailability of lawyers representing the
side of the poor. The Court in Turner v. Rogers83 decided that there is
no right to appointment of counsel in a civil contempt proceeding in
part because it assumed the question of the ability to pay child support
is a simple one,84 but perhaps the issue is not simple; it is just
underlitigated.85 If we find cases simple because lawyers have not
handled them frequently enough to develop a complex body of case
law, and then we deem those cases unworthy of appointment of counsel
because of the lack of complexity, the underdevelopment of law on
behalf of the poor recreates itself in an unfortunate feedback loop.
Obviating the need for lawyers is tempting as a democratic project,
given the skepticism the legal profession has earned by its own conduct
and the important observations of critical scholars highlighting the
power dynamics at play in the lawyer-client relationship.86 Yet
democratic values like dignity and voice are not necessarily satisfied by
the opportunity to fill out forms. Court access must mean more.87
82.
See generally Rebecca Sharpless, More Than One Lane Wide: Against
Hierarchies of Helping in Progressive Legal Advocacy, 19 CLINICAL L. REV. 347
(2012).
83.
564 U.S. 431 (2011).
84.
Id. at 438.
85.
See Laura K. Abel, Turner v. Rogers and the Right of Meaningful Access
to the Courts, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 805, 816–18 (2012) (questioning the Court’s
assumptions about the lack of complexity and highlighting contrary evidence in the
record).
86.
See Dana Remus, Reconstructing Professionalism 21–23 (Apr. 30, 2015)
(unpublished manuscript), [https://perma.cc/GT3X-HWLH].
87.
Luban, supra note 29, at *22 (“[T]hose who defend the right of selfrepresentation on autonomy grounds usually offer merely ‘an abstract idea of freedom
of choice,’ without explaining why freedom to personally handle the minutiae of a civil
trial is a choice that matters. . . . [W]hat does matter is having one’s voice and
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Relatedly, while it is important to examine the power dynamics
between lawyers and clients, it remains as important as ever to maintain
the strength of lawyers who can protect clients from third parties who
wield far more dangerous power.88
Advocates of simplicity are right that access to justice should mean
more than access to lawyers.89 But they are wrong if they suggest the
latter is entirely extraneous to the pursuit of the former. Barton says
people need housing, not housing lawyers.90 It is undeniable that
housing is a first order need while legal representation is not. But
sometimes representation helps people meet their more basic needs.
Sometimes lawyers force actors with material resources to transfer
those resources, which can make an enormous difference to the
recipient, and sometimes lawyers can push substantive law in a better
direction for the future. To deny these aspects of lawyers’ work is to
imply a profound loss of faith in the professional project and the
potential of public interest law.91
CONCLUSION
The promise of faster, cheaper justice is tempting, and if
individual litigants seem satisfied with simpler procedures, it sounds
anti-democratic to object. Yet customer service and economic
efficiency are not, and should not become, the core values of justice.
Financial costs will always influence the details of policy, but the
distribution and consequences of costs reflect economic and political
choices. These are not absolute laws of the universe but instead
variables subject to creative adjustment. In designing a system of
justice, considerations of cost should be secondary to our core values.
The time required for legal proceedings also, while a relevant variable,
should not accumulate outsized weight. There are some rights too
fundamental to sacrifice for speed. Moreover, while it may be

viewpoint reflected . . .”) (quoting RABEEA ASSY, INJUSTICE IN PERSON: THE RIGHT TO
SELF-REPRESENTATION 154 (2015)).
88.
See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’
ETHICS 8 (4th ed. 2010) (“In expressing the distinctive feature of ethics in the legal
profession, we would identify the client not as ‘this person over whom I have power,’
but as ‘this other person whom I have the power to help.’”); William H. Simon, The
Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on Poverty Law Scholarship in the
Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099, 1110 (1994) (“[T]he . . .
concern with lawyer oppression of clients has increased, while the scale of material and
organizational ambitions has declined.”).
89.
See Barton, supra note 2, at 1234.
90.
Id. at 1269.
91.
See Remus, supra note 86, at 38; Roiphe, supra note 34, at 652.
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controversial to delay matters intentionally, slowness can in some cases
serve as a desperately needed restraint on the application of force.
The purpose of this essay is not to argue against all simplification
measures. Scholars like Jessica Steinberg and Russell Engler have
offered thoughtful approaches to designing a hybrid of simplification
and an increase in appointment of counsel.92 Certainly, common-sense
reforms could make poor people’s courts less like Kafka’s Trial.93
Creation of form pleadings would be beneficial in non-contested
matters94 and potentially some contested matters.95 For example, in
many jurisdictions, courts already provide complaint forms for
landlords initiating eviction proceedings to check the boxes indicating
the bases for the actions. To provide form pleadings for landlords, the
disproportionately represented parties, and not tenants, the
disproportionately unrepresented parties, is backwards, and correction
of that asymmetry could be productive. Other simplification devices,
using technology for document assembly, could also have a normatively
positive impact.
Yet the question remains whether such measures might not go far
enough or, more to the point, might go too far in the wrong direction.
We should not confuse the benefits that flow from the availability of
form answers with the benefits that flow from the availability of zealous
advocates.96 As we experiment with simplification in the name of access
to justice, it is incumbent upon us to keep in mind what we mean by
justice. Promotion of public law values, namely
democratic
participation and limiting excesses of power, must remain among our
highest priorities.

92.
See Engler, supra note 6 (offering comparative assessments of pro se
reform and appointment of counsel across different areas); Steinberg supra note 4, at
747 (proposing reforms including mandatory form pleadings for both sides, revision of
evidentiary rules, and guidelines to limit judicial discretion).
93.
See Barton, supra note 2, at 1270 n.230 (identifying a need to train court
personnel on common courtesy and how to avoid conveying the appearance of bias).
94.
See Steinberg, supra note 4, at 786 (describing absurdly complex process
for non-contested divorce).
95.
See Brescia, supra note 11, at 213–14 (describing mass production of
eviction answers that include warranty of habitability defenses and reference appendixes
where tenants can list specifics of substandard conditions).
96.
Whether all advocates should be lawyers remains a good question, and
whether all advocates are zealous is one whose answer must be no. See Luban, supra
note 29, at *12–15.

